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This paper has a twofold purpose. In the context of a structural macroeconomic model, 
it derives estimates of the Federal Reserve's preference parameters in its pre and post-
1980 loss function. We  show  that  there was an economically, but not statistically, 
significant change in the preferences of the U.S. Fed towards inflation stabilization. We 
also  derive, within a strict inflation targeting regime, the optimal changes in the Fed's 
reaction to expected  inflation as a function of the forward looking parameters in the 
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There are now a number of papers which derive optimal monetary policy rules in the
context of structural macroeconomic models.1 One common feature of these works is
that the resulting reduced form coeﬃcients in the policy rule are composed of two sets
of structural parameters, some pertaining to the monetary authority’s loss function and
others describing the behavior of the private sector. While these papers derive normative
prescriptions about the monetary authority behavior, very few estimates of the deep
parameters in the monetary authority’s loss function are available in the literature. The
present paper provides such estimates.
It has also been recently argued that there was a shift in the way monetary policy
was conducted with the arrival of Paul Volcker to the Federal Reserve (Clarida, Gal´ ı, and
Gertler (1999) and Boivin and Giannoni (2003) among others). The strategy followed by
these researchers is based on estimating policy rules across sample periods and comparing
the values of the long run coeﬃcients on expected inﬂation. However, these empirical
papers typically do not identify the Fed’s preferences embedded in the optimal policy rule
coeﬃcients.2 In this paper we show that there was indeed an economically signiﬁcant
change in the Fed’s preferences in the early 80s towards more inﬂation stabilization.
The second goal of this paper is to derive the optimal changes in the policy reaction
function as the private sector becomes more forward-looking. This is a relevant question
as papers by Boivin and Giannoni (2003) and Moreno (2003) have reported a signiﬁcant
increase of the private sector forward-looking behavior in the supply equation. To this
end, we consider a standard three equation Rational Expectations macro model which
exhibits endogenous persistence in the inﬂation rate, the output gap and the Federal
funds rate. In the context of a strict inﬂation targeting framework, we show that the
monetary authority should react more strongly to inﬂation as the price setting becomes
more forward-looking up to a point. The reason is that when agents are very forward-
looking, it is no longer eﬀective to react more aggressively to inﬂation deviations from
target when the price setting becomes more forward-looking. A similar ﬁnding is obtained
in the case of the forward-looking parameter in the demand equation.
1Clarida, Gal´ ı, and Gertler (1999), Woodford (2002) or Lansing and Trehan (2003) are some examples.
2S¨ oderlind (1999) and Cecchetti and Ehrman (2000) obtain estimates of deep parameters. How-
ever, their work is not focused on the shift of the preferences of the U.S. Fed in the early 80s. Their
methodology is also quite diﬀerent to ours.
1The paper proceeds as follows. First, we lay out the complete structural model which
we consider. In the following section we deﬁne the monetary policy plan and obtain
estimates of the Fed’s preferences in its loss function for diﬀerent sample periods. In
section 4 we derive the optimal changes in the Fed’s long run response coeﬃcient on
inﬂation as a function of the supply and demand forward-looking parameters. Section 5
concludes.
2 A Model for the US Economy
We ﬁrst describe a simple macro model for the US economy which has been used in recent
monetary policy studies such as Rotemberg and Woodford (1998). The model comprises
supply, demand and monetary policy equations:
¼t = ±Et¼t+1 + (1 ¡ ±)¼t¡1 + ¸yt + ²ASt (1)
yt = ¹Etyt+1 + (1 ¡ ¹)yt¡1 ¡ Á(it ¡ Et¼t+1 ¡ ¯ rr) + ²ISt (2)
it = ¯ rr + ¯ ¼ + ½it¡1 + (1 ¡ ½)[¯(Et¼t+1 ¡ ¯ ¼) + °yt] + ²MPt (3)
¼t and yt are the inﬂation rate and detrended output between time t¡1 and t respectively,
and it is the Federal funds rate at time t. ¯ rr is the long run natural real interest rate
and ¯ ¼ is the long run level of inﬂation. One advantage of this macro model is that while
being both parsimonious and structural, its implied dynamics are broadly consistent with
those documented by empirical VAR studies.
The Aggregate Supply (AS) equation in (1) is a generalization of the Calvo (1983)
pricing equation. The IS or demand equation in (2) can be derived through representative
agent lifetime utility maximization as in Fuhrer (2000). Its endogenous persistence is due
to the presence of habit formation in the utility function. Finally, the monetary policy
equation in (3) is the one proposed by Clarida, Gal´ ı, and Gertler (2000). In this policy
rule, the monetary authority smoothes the interest rate path and reacts to expected
inﬂation and to the output gap.
Table 1 shows the full information maximum likelihood (FIML) estimates obtained
by the procedure described in Moreno (2003). We use Consumer Price Index (CPI)
inﬂation, output detrended quadratically and the Federal funds rate. Given the evidence
2of parameter instability documented in the literature, two sample periods were identiﬁed
on the basis of the sup-Wald statistic derived by Bai, Lumsdaine, and Stock (1998). The
sup-Wald test detects the fourth quarter of 1980 as the most likely break date in the
parameters of an unconstrained vector autoregression. Accordingly, we start the second
subsample on the fourth quarter of 1980.3
Three major facts emerge from the parameter estimates. First, the three standard
deviations of the structural shocks were lower in the second period, especially the one
corresponding to the IS shock. This implies that macroeconomic conditions were more
benign in the 80’s and 90’s. Second, the Fed reacted more strongly to expected inﬂation
in the second period, although not signiﬁcantly so. Third, private agents put more weight
on expected inﬂation in the AS equation during the second period.
In the next section we will use these parameter estimates to obtain the probability
distribution of the monetary authority’s preferences in its loss function across sample
periods.
3 Estimates of the Preferences in the Loss Function
of the Federal Reserve
Clarida, Gal´ ı, and Gertler (1999) ﬁrst documented an increase in the Fed’s long run
response to expected inﬂation after 1979. It is commonplace in the literature to see
changes in this response arising from a shift in the preferences of the monetary authority.
However, optimal monetary policy papers such as Woodford (2002) show that the long
run response coeﬃcients are also a function of structural private sector parameters. In
this context, it could be that the Fed reacted more strongly to inﬂation after 1980 because
it detected a modiﬁcation in some structural parameters of the economy. In this section
we show that the Fed’s more aggressive response to expected inﬂation was indeed the
result of a change in its preferences.
We ﬁrst formulate the optimization problem of the Federal Reserve which gives rise
3Both estimations yield a stationary Rational Expectations solution. The ﬁrst period estimates imply
multiple equilibria. In this instance we choose the equilibrium associated with the Recursive Method in
Cho and Moreno (2003) which selects the bubble-free equilibrium.
















subject to equations (1) and (2). Ã is the subjective time discount factor. ¸¼, ¸i and
¸∆ are the objective function weights on expected inﬂation, interest rate variation and
interest rate changes, respectively. This objective function implies that the Fed manages
the nominal interest rate so as to stabilize deviations of expected inﬂation from its target
as well as the current output gap. Additionally, the Fed tries to avoid excessive interest
rate variation as well as deviations of the current interest rate from its past value. Since
this objective function does not contain expected future terms beyond the next period
inﬂation forecast, this optimization problem falls under the category of discretion. In
other words, the Fed reoptimizes every period the objective function in (4) in order to
choose the value of its instrument, the Federal funds rate.4

















Matching these coeﬃcients with those in the Clarida, Gal´ ı, and Gertler (2000) rule in

















Equation (6) shows that as the Fed puts more weight on expected inﬂation deviations
from target, it responds more aggressively to expected inﬂation in the policy rule. The
partial derivatives in the policy rule coeﬃcients reﬂect the constraints imposed by the
4Svensson (2003) criticizes forecast-based instrument rules of this kind on the grounds of time incon-
sistency. Our goal in this paper is to provide a deeper interpretation of the coeﬃcients in an interest
rate rule which seems to capture the short term interest rate dynamics quite closely. Accordingly, the
loss function which we consider does not include any term of periods other than the current one. This
precludes the appearance of the term Etit+1 as an argument in the reaction function.
4AS and IS equations in the optimization program of the monetary authority. Equations
(6) and (7) show that it is optimal to react more strongly to expected inﬂation and the
output gap when these two variables become more sensitive to changes in the interest




@it will be negative for
reasonable parameter values as obtained in our estimations. Equation (8) shows that
the optimal coeﬃcient on the interest rate lag, ½, grows in tandem with the tendency of
the Fed towards smoothing the interest rate. Finally, when the Fed puts less weight on
interest rate variability the three policy coeﬃcients become larger.
One diﬃculty in computing the partial derivatives in our setting is the endogeneity
of the interest rate, it, in our model. However, given our policy rule, we can distinguish
an exogenous part as a source of interest rate ﬂuctuations, the monetary policy shock
²MPt. In Appendix A we derive these partial derivatives by proxying changes in it with
changes in its exogenous part. Hence, we can identify ¸¼, ¸i and ¸∆ uniquely by setting
Ã to 0.99, a standard value in the literature. In order to compute the diﬀerences in the
Fed’s loss function weights across sample periods, we use the parameter estimates shown
in Table 1.
The estimates in Table 2 show that there was an increase in ¸¼, implying a larger
concern of the Fed about deviations of expected inﬂation from its target. Accordingly,
the larger estimate of the long run response to expected inﬂation can indeed be eco-
nomically attributed to changes in the preferences of the monetary authority, and not
to changes in the structural parameters in the AS and IS equations.5 Table 2 also lists
the implied monetary policy weights on the expected inﬂation, interest rate and interest
rate diﬀerence terms for both periods. The poinit estimates show that the Fed was less
concerned about interest rate variability in the second period, since the term ¸i became
smaller in the 80’s and 90’s. ¸∆ is larger in the second period, reﬂecting an increasing
concern of the monetary authority towards smoothing the interest rate path.
In order to draw statistical inference, we compute the probability distributions of
the policy parameters. To this end, we perform a Montecarlo simulation by taking
draws from the distributions of the structural parameters and computing the policy
preferences. We repeat this exercise 1000 times, yielding a probability distribution for
5In a related exercise within a more stylized framework, Cecchetti and Ehrman (2000) show that
the Central Banks of several countries which adopted inﬂation targeting put more weight on inﬂation
deviations after the adoption date.
5the policy weights. Explosive solutions to the structural model and negative values for the
policy preferences were discarded in the process. The ﬁrst set of 90% conﬁdence intervals
appears in parentheses below the point estimates in Table 2. It shows that there is plenty
of statistical uncertainty regarding the values of the preference parameters, especially in
the second period. In our exercise, this uncertainty stems from the combined uncertainty
of the structural parameters, which is especially pronounced in the monetary transmission
mechanism parameters, ¸ and Á. We then compute conﬁdence intervals ﬁxing these two
parameters. They appear in square brackets. While the intervals are still quite large,
they are clearly tighter than in the ﬁrst case. For instance, the weight on expected
inﬂation is signiﬁcantly larger in the second period. This ﬁnding implies that much of
the uncertainty in the policy preferences is due to the large standard errors of ¸ and Á.
To summarize the results in this section, we showed that there was an important
shift in the preferences of the Fed since 1980 in favor of inﬂation stabilization. This
date approximately coincides with the arrival of Paul Volcker to the Federal Reserve
Board. We also showed that this result is not statistically signiﬁcant. This uncertainty
was shown to stem mainly from the imprecise estimates of the parameters describing the
monetary policy transmission mechanism.
4 Optimal Policy Under Endogenous Persistence
Our macroeconomic model exhibits endogenous persistence in the supply and demand
equations. This endogenous persistence is captured by the private sector parameters (1-±)
and (1-¹) in the structural model. As ± and ¹ become larger, inﬂation and output display
less persistency. As shown in the previous section, the optimal response of the Fed to
expected inﬂation depends on all the parameters of the structural model. In this section
we assess the impact of changes in these private sector parameters on the optimal Fed’s
response to expected inﬂation. This is a relevant issue, since the estimates in Boivin and
Giannoni (2003) and Moreno (2003) show a signiﬁcant increase in ±, the forward-looking
parameter in the AS equation, during the 80s and 90s.
In order to determine unique optimal relations between ¯ and ± and between ¯ and
¹, we will assume in our analysis that the monetary authority practices strict inﬂation
targeting, i.e. ° = 0. In Appendix B, we show how to derive the optimal relation between
6the long run response to inﬂation and the forward-looking parameters through numer-
ical approximations. These approximations can be computed via the implicit function
theorem, since the partial derivatives in (6) depend on ¯ and both ± and ¹ . As shown
in this appendix, the sign relation between the Fed’s response to inﬂation and these













; k > 0 ±;¹ 2 µi (9)
where ˜ ¯ is an implicit function of ¯.
The top panel of Figure 1 graphs f(µ) as a function of ¯ for diﬀerent values of ¸,
including the estimated one, 0.0072. The remaining AS and IS parameters are ﬁxed at
their ﬁrst period estimates, whereas the policy parameters are ﬁxed at their second period
values. Results do not change if we ﬁx all the remaining parameters at either their 1st or
2nd period values. The top panel of Figure 1 shows that, for realistic parameter values
(¯ > 0:2), f(µ) is an increasing function of ¯. This implies that the denominator in (9)
will always be positive for a reasonable parameter space. Hence the sign of the implicit
function’s partial derivative,
@ ˜ ¯
@µi, depends inversely on the sign of the partial derivative
@f(µ)
@µi .
Panel B of Figure 1 shows that f(µ) is initially a decreasing function of ±. However,
when ± becomes larger (approximately 0.6), f(µ) becomes and increasing function of ±.
This implies that for values of ± smaller than 0.6 the Fed should react more strongly
to expected inﬂation as agents become more forward-looking in the supply equation.
However, when ± is suﬃciently large, the Fed should respond less aggressively.
To understand the intuition behind this result, recall that the loss function in (5)
implies that the Fed will react more strongly to expected inﬂation when changes in
the interest rate are more eﬀective in reducing expected inﬂation. Our structural macro
model contains two monetary transmission mechanisms from the interest rate to inﬂation.
Interest rate changes aﬀect the output gap through the real rate in the IS equation. In
turn, output gap movements inﬂuence inﬂation through the Phillips curve relation in
the AS equation. The second channel consists of expectational eﬀects. As the monetary
authority reacts more aggressively to inﬂation, the private sector adjusts its inﬂation
expectations which aﬀect directly the inﬂation rate. We now show how the eﬀectiveness
7of monetary policy varies with the endogenous persistence of inﬂation and the output
gap.
At small values of ±, contractionary monetary policy is quite eﬀective in reducing
expected inﬂation, as future inﬂation still depends heavily on current inﬂation. Hence as
agents become more forward-looking when ± is still not very large, current inﬂation will
experience a larger reduction following an interest rate increase (since the term ±Et¼t+1
in the supply equation will be larger in absolute value). This reinforces the decline
in expected inﬂation making contractionary monetary policy more eﬀective. However,
at high values of ±, expected inﬂation does not greatly depend on current inﬂation.
Accordingly, increases in ± will make expected inﬂation even less dependent on future
inﬂation (and will also make the term ±Et¼t+1 smaller in absolute value) so that monetary
policy will be less eﬀective in reducing expected inﬂation. This implies the existence of
a cutoﬀ value ±¤ such that for ± > ±¤, it is no longer optimal to react more aggressively
to expected inﬂation as ± grows.
Panel B of Figure 1 performs a calibration exercise around diﬀerent values of the
Phillips curve parameter ¸. It shows that when monetary policy is less eﬀective in
reducing inﬂation volatility (for smaller values of ¸), the cutoﬀ value is smaller, whereas
for larger values of ¸, the cutoﬀ value is higher. Finally, the top panel of Figure 2 presents
the impulse responses of inﬂation to a monetary policy shock. It shows that for low values
of ± in the AS equation, as agents become more forward-looking, monetary policy is more
eﬀective in reducing inﬂation for about 15 periods. However, when ± is very large, the
opposite is true during the 50 periods following the shock. These two pieces of evidence
corroborate the ideas in the previous paragraph.6
Panel C of Figure 1 graphs f(µ) as a function of ¹, the forward-looking parameter in
the IS equation. It is decreasing up to values of ¹ close to 0.4, when it starts to increase.
As a result, for values of ¹ close to 0.5, as estimated in our sample, increases in the
forward-looking behavior of agents in the IS equation should be followed by a smaller
reaction of the Fed to expected inﬂation. The reason is that for large values of ¹, a
smaller output gap persistence will make monetary policy less eﬀective, since the way
it inﬂuences inﬂation is by contracting the output gap. However, when ¹ is below 0.4,
increases in the forward-looking parameter in the IS equation will reinforce the eﬀect
of contractionary monetary policy on the current output gap (through a larger value of
6We stress that our results are limited to the case of strict inﬂation targeting.
8the ¹Etyt+1 term in the IS equation). The mechanism is analogous to that of ± and is
illustrated on Panel B of Figure 2. When ¹ is small, as it grows, monetary policy becomes
more eﬀective in reducing inﬂation, whereas the opposite is true when ¹ is large.
Our results resemble those obtained by Lansing and Trehan (2003) in a related op-
timal monetary policy exercise. There are however some diﬀerences. In their case, as
¹ grows, it is optimal to react less aggressively to inﬂation as long as ¹ is greater than
0.1, whereas in our paper the cutoﬀ value ¹¤ is 0.4. While Lansing and Trehan (2003)
include output gap stabilization in their central bank loss function, they also consider a
diﬀerent structural model. Whereas in the present paper the expectations inﬂuence all
the variables contemporaneously, in their case it is the lagged expectations which aﬀect
the current period variables. This implies that in our exercise the expectations and the
current values aﬀect each other simultaneously, so that as ¹ grows, monetary policy is
more eﬀective up to higher values of ¹ (since the current output gap will react more
strongly to interest rate changes). Our results also diﬀer in the case of optimal monetary
policy for diﬀerent values of ±. In Lansing and Trehan (2003) it is not until ± is around
0.95 that increases in ± should restrain the monetary policy reaction, whereas in our
case the cutoﬀ value is around 0.60. This occurs because monetary policy starts being
ineﬀective earlier in our case.
To understand the diﬀerent optimal Fed’s behavior under increases of ¹ and ± in our
exercise (¹¤ is larger with respect to Lansing and Trehan (2003) whereas ±¤ is smaller),
notice that a given increase in a parameter results in a larger percentage increase at small
parameter values. This eﬀect dominates at small values of ¹, where initial increases of ¹
have a sizable eﬀect on the output gap, with the output gap being still quite persistent.
However, in the case of ±, when this parameter is quite large, further increases of ± would
have two eﬀects. On the one hand, the percentage increase in ± is small and on the
other hand, it exacerbates the already small degree of persistence in inﬂation, making
expected inﬂation depend even less on current inﬂation. These two eﬀects are ampliﬁed
in our exercise, where expectations aﬀect the macro variables contemporaneously.
The results in this section illustrate the importance of the expectational eﬀects in
monetary policy management. As the private sector becomes more forward-looking,
expectations of the future variables behave diﬀerently, so that the eﬀects of monetary
policy actions also diﬀer. One important implication of our study is that the monetary
authority should not modify its reaction to inﬂation monotonically as changes in the
9private sector behavior occur.
5 Conclusion
This paper shows that there was an economically, but not statistically, signiﬁcant change
in the preferences of the Federal Reserve after 1980 towards inﬂation stabilization. We
also show, in the context of a strict inﬂation targeting regime, the optimal changes in
the Fed’s reaction to expected inﬂation when the forward-looking behavior of the private
sector changes.
The importance of the private sector’s degree of forward-looking behavior has been
highlighted in this paper. There have been several attempts in the literature to derive
aggregate supply equations featuring both forward and backward looking components.
Fuhrer and Moore (1995), for instance, develops a real wage contracting model with
endogenous persistence. In this case, the persistence is induced by the existence of wage-
setters who adjust their current real wages with respect to past real wages. One caveat
of these works is that the endogenous persistence of inﬂation is not ultimately grounded
in optimizing behavior. A better understanding of the sources of inﬂation persistence
would be desirable as the Fed’s optimal policy changes with it.
10Appendix
A Computing the Partial Derivatives
Equations (6) and (7) show that the optimal ¯ and ° coeﬃcients in our reaction function
depend on partial derivatives of the target variables with respect to interest rate changes.
In order to compute these partial derivatives, we recognize both an endogenous and an
exogenous part in our model’s interest rate:
it = ˆ {t +˜ {t (10)
where, in mean deviation, ˆ {t = ½it¡1 + (1 ¡ ½)(¯Et¼t+1 + °yt) and ˜ {t = ²MPt. Therefore,
˜ {t constitutes the exogenous part. In this setting, we can proxy the partial derivative
terms involving changes in it with changes in ˜ {t by applying vector diﬀerentiation rules
to our model solution. The implied model’s solution is: ¯ Xt+1 = Ω ¯ Xt + Γ²t+1, where
¯ Xt = [¼t xt it]0 in demeaned form. Since the next period expectations can be
expressed as Et ¯ Xt+1 = Ω ¯ Xt, we can obtain:
Et ¯ Xt+1 = Ω(Ω ¯ Xt¡1 + Γ²t) (11)
Therefore
@Et ¯ Xt+1
@²t = ΩΓ, so that
@Et¼t+1




= Ω11Γ13 + Ω12Γ23 + Ω13Γ33 (12)
In order to obtain the partial derivative
@yt
@˜ {t in equation (7), we follow the procedure
described above and use the IS equation to obtain:
@yt
@˜ {t
= Γ13(¹Ω21 + ÁΩ11) + Γ23(¹Ω22 + ÁΩ12) + Γ33(¹Ω23 + Á(1 ¡ Ω13)) (13)
B Optimal Fed Behavior
In this second part of the Appendix, we derive the optimal changes in the Fed’s reaction
to expected inﬂation when the behavior of the private sector in the AS and IS equations







In the previous appendix, we computed an approximation to the term
@Et¼t+1
@it . As can
be seen in equation (12), this term depends on the reduced form elements of the model’s
Rational Expectations solution which, in turn, also depend on ¯. Therefore, we can apply
the Implicit Function theorem to equation (14) so as to determine how the Fed would
change its reaction to expected inﬂation when the private sector becomes more forward
looking in the supply and demand equations.




±;¸;¹;Á;¯;°;½ 2 µ (15)
Then, we can rewrite (14) as:











1 + k ¢
@f(µ)
@¯
8µi 2 µ (17)
In order to obtain the sign of the partial derivatives, we can compute numerically vectors
of the Ωij and Γij terms in (12) as a function of ±, ¹ and ¯ holding the remaining
parameters constant. In this way, we can construct f(µ) in (12) as a function of each




@¯ and, in turn,
the sign of the derivative
@ ˜ ¯
@µi for ±;¹ 2 µi. Figure 1 graphs the functions involved in the
implicit function derivatives in (17).
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14Table 1: FIML estimates





















This Table shows the FIML parameter estimates of the structural New Keynesian macro model ob-
tained by the procedure outlined in Moreno (2003). CPI inﬂation, output detrended quadratically
and the Federal funds rate are the variables used in estimation. The ﬁrst subsample spans the period
1957:2Q-1980:3Q and the second subsample covers the period 1980:4Q-2001:2Q. The model’s equations
in demeaned form are:
¼t = ±Et¼t+1 + (1 ¡ ±)¼t¡1 + ¸yt + ²ASt
yt = ¹Etyt+1 + (1 ¡ ¹)yt¡1 ¡ Á(rt ¡ Et¼t+1) + ²IS;t
rt = ½rt¡1 + (1 ¡ ½)[¯Et¼t+1 + °yt] + ²MPt
15Table 2: Implied weights of the U.S. Fed in its Objective Function
Panel A: CPI
1st Period 2nd Period
¸¼ 1.2937 6.1078
(0.7415 28.4476) (1.0966 122.2351)
[0.9066 3.5010] [3.1023 72.8869]
¸i 0.1039 0.0599
(0.0363 0.4079) (0.0192 0.3810)
[0.0675 0.3131] [0.0214 0.1246]
¸∆ 0.3545 0.4334
(0.1112 2.1532) (0.1211 3.5913)
[0.1796 1.5693] [0.2980 2.2491]
This Table lists the preference parameters in the objective function of the Federal Reserve in (4) across
sample periods. ¸¼ is the weight on expected inﬂation, ¸i is the weight on the interest rate and ¸∆
is the weight on the the interest rate ﬁrst diﬀerence. Two sets of 90% conﬁdence intervals obtained
through a Montecarlo simulation appear in parenthesis and square brackets below the point estimates.
The ﬁrst set excludes both explosive model’s solutions and negative values for the Fed’s preferences in
the Montecarlo study. The second set additionally ﬁxes the parameters ¸ and Á in the simulations.
16Panel A: Denominator slope (f(¯))










Panel B: Numerator slope ( f(±))















Figure 1: f(µ) functions used to compute the Implicit Function Derivative
17Panel C: Numerator slope (f(¹))
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Figure 1: (continued) f(µ) functions used to compute the Implicit Function Derivative
Panel A graphs the function in (15) (f(µ)) depending on ¯ and holding the remaining parameters ﬁxed.
Panel B graphs it as a function of ± and Panel C graphs it as a function of ¹. The slope of these functions
determine the signs of the numerator and denominator of the Implicit Function derivative in equation
(17).
18Panel A: AS Equation Forward Looking Parameter


























Panel B: IS Equation Forward Looking Parameter



























Figure 2: Inﬂation Responses to a Monetary Policy Shock
This ﬁgure presents the response functions of inﬂation to a monetary policy shock. Panel A presents
responses under alternative values of ±, whereas Panel B shows inﬂation responses for diﬀerent values of
¹. The remaining model’s parameters are held at their second period estimates.
19